President Bush is absolutely clear about why the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world is not only consistent with American values, but central to American interests. He laid out that logic in an address just a few months ago, right here at the National Defense University: 1 Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in the cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought off.
The President's analysis of the link between the lack of democracy in the Arab world and terrorism is shared across the political spectrum in the United States. 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry accepted the need for greater political reform in the Middle East as an integral part of the war on terrorism.
2 New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, America's leading commentator on foreign affairs, has done more to propound this syllogism to the attentive American public than anyone else. 3 A senior Middle East policy maker in the Clinton Administration, after September 11, contended that the Administration he served had ignored the democracy issue in the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace. In this prominent mea culpa, he said that strategy was a mistake and urged a new American policy focused on political reform. 4 A recent book published by the Council on Foreign Relations, whose lead author was the Director of Policy Planning in the Clinton State Department, argues that the roots of alQa'ida are in the poverty and educational deficiencies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. These deficiencies were caused by the authoritarian nature of those states, and can only be combated by their democratization.
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The syllogism underlying the Bush Administration's emphasis on political reform in the Middle East as a necessary part of the war on terrorism is widely accepted, and is not going to disappear when the neo-conservatives leave office. We must support the development of free and democratic societies in the Arab and Muslim worlds to win the war of ideas…In a Kerry Administration, America will be clear with repressive governments in the region that we expect to see them change, not just for our sake but for their own survival." www.johnkerry.com/issues/national_security/terrorism.html. Last accessed December 28, 2004. 3 For example: "Because if it is impossible for the peoples of even one Arab state to voluntarily organize themselves around a social contract for democratic life, then we are looking at dictators and kings ruling this region as far as the eye can see. And that will guarantee that this region will be a cauldron of oilfinanced pathologies and terrorism for the rest of our lives." New York Times, January 6, 2005. While there is a logic to the syllogism linking a lack of democracy to terrorism, that logic can be challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirically, the numbers just do not appear to bear out a close link between terrorism and the lack of democracy. Between 2000 and 2003, based on the State Department's annual Global Patterns of Terrorism, 269 major terrorist incidents occurred in countries classified as "free" in the Freedom House Freedom in the World annual report; 119 such incidents occurred in countries classified as "partly free;" and 138 occurred in countries classified as "not free."
Terrorism and Democracy: The Empirical Evidence
6 This is not to argue that free countries are more likely to produce terrorists than other countries. The free country subject to the greatest number of terrorist incidents (and, by far, the greatest number of terrorist incidents of any country in the world) is India. It is fair to assume that a number of those terrorist incidents, in Kashmir, are perpetrated by groups based in Pakistan, though clearly not all of them. It is simply to point out that there appears, at least on a first glance at the numbers, to be no clear relationship between type of government and likelihood of terrorist activity.
The case of India stands out in bold relief in these numbers. Terrorist incidents in India account for fully 75% of all terrorist incidents in free countries in the four years surveyed. A vibrant democracy with the full range of political rights available to its citizens, India has rightly been held up as an example of the possibility of democracy outside the context of wealthy Western countries. Thomas Friedman regularly asserts that it is Indian democracy which has kept extremist Islamist ideologies from dominating the Indian Muslim community. Yet, as strong as Indian democracy is, one Indian Prime Minister was assassinated (Indira Gandhi by a Sikh extremist) and a former Prime Minister campaigning to regain the office was assassinated (her son, Rajiv Gandhi, by Tamil extremists) by political opponents. If democracy reduces the prospects for terrorism, India's numbers should not be so high. It is also interesting to note that in 2003, two countries classified as "not free" accounted for 50% of the terrorist incidents in "not free" countries -Iraq and Afghanistan. At least for that year, movement toward democracy did not lessen the incentives for terrorists to operate in those countries.
More anecdotal evidence also calls into question a necessary relationship between regime type, particularly democracy, and terrorism. In the 1970's and 1980's, democratic countries generated a number of brutal terrorist organizations: the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provisional IRA in Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group) in West Germany. The transition to democracy in Spain did not eliminate ETA (Basque separatist) terrorism. Turkish democracy suffered through a decade of mounting political violence from the late 1960's through the late 1970's. In fact, a statistical study based upon data through the 1980's found a strong positive correlation between democracy and terrorism. 7 The strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has been the subject of terrorist assault, but has also produced some number of its own terrorists, including the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Nearly every day presents a painful reminder that real democratization in Iraq has been accompanied by serious terrorism. There is a memorial in Oklahoma City testifying to the fact that our own democracy has not been free of domestic terrorism.
There is no empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any other regime type, and terrorism, in either a positive or a negative direction. 8 Terrorism springs from sources other than form of government. There is no reason, based on the evidence of the past, to believe that a more democratic Arab world will generate fewer terrorists.
Terrorism and Democracy: Logic, Theory and al-Qa'ida
There are also logical and theoretical problems, as well as these empirical problems, with the syllogism underlying the American push for democracy as part of the war on terrorism. The underlying logic of the assertion that democracy will reduce terrorism is the belief that, able to participate openly in competitive politics and have their voices heard in the public square, potential terrorists and terrorist sympathizers will not feel the need to resort to violence to achieve their goals. Even if they lose in one round, the confidence that they will be able to win in the future will inhibit the temptation to use extra-democratic means. The habits of democracy will ameliorate extremism.
Well, maybe. But it is just as logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas that could mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based. If they cannot achieve their goals through democratic politics, why should we assume that they will privilege the democratic process over those goals? It seems more likely that, having been mobilized into politics by a burning desire to achieve a goal, a desire so strong that they were willing to take up arms and commit acts of violence against defenseless civilians in order to realize it, terrorists and potential terrorists will attack democracy and its processes if those processes do not produce their desired result. Respect for American democracy did not stop Southern slave-holders and their supporters from taking up arms in 1861. Respect for the nascent Iraqi democracy, despite a very successful election in January 2005, has not stopped Iraqi and foreign terrorists from their campaign against the new political order in that country. If the goal is important enough, it will trump democracy for some number of militants, who in turn might become terrorists.
Moreover, we know that terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small and secretive. They are not organized or based on democratic principles. They revolve around strong leaders and a cluster of committed followers, willing to take actions from which the vast majority of people, even people who might support their political agenda, would rightly shrink. It seems unlikely that simply being outvoted would deflect them from their path.
America's major foe in the war on terrorism, al-Qa'ida, certainly would not close up shop if every Muslim country in the world were to become a democracy. Usama bin Laden has been very clear about democracy -he does not like it. His political model is not democratic; it is the early years of the Muslim caliphate. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was the closest in modern times to that model in bin Laden's view. In an October 2003 "message to Iraqis," bin Laden castigated those in the Arab world who are "calling for a peaceful democratic solution in dealing with apostate governments or which Jewish and crusader invaders instead of fighting in the name of God." He referred to democracy as "this deviant and misleading practice," and "the faith of the ignorant."
9 His view of American democracy is equally negative: "The majority of you [Americans] are vulgar and without sound ethics or good manners. You elect the evil from among you, the greatest liars and the least decent…" 10 Bin Laden's ally in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab alZarqawi, was even more direct in his reaction to the Iraqi election of January 2005: "The legislator who must be obeyed in a democracy is man, and not Allah…That is the very essence of heresy and polytheism and error, as it contradicts the bases of the faith and monotheism, and because it makes the weak, ignorant man Allah's partner in His most central divine prerogativenamely, ruling and legislating." Al-Qa'ida is not fighting for democracy. Its leaders profoundly distrust democracy, and not just on ideological grounds. They know that they could not come to power through free elections. There is absolutely no reason to believe that a move to more democratic Arab states would deflect them from their course. There is no reason to believe that they would not be able to recruit followers in more democratic Arab states, as long as those more democratic Arab states continued to have good relations with the United States, made peace with Israel and generally behaved in ways that Washington hopes that they will. It is the American agenda in the Middle East, as much if not more than democracy itself, to which al-Qa'ida objects. As Washington hopes that a democratic Middle East will be a Middle East that continues to accept a major American role and cooperates with American goals, it is simply foolish to think that democracy will dry up support for al-Qa'ida.
When it works, liberal democracy is the best form of government. It affirms the dignity of each person in the right to vote. It provides the check of popular elections on those in power, along with other constitutional and legal barriers to the abuse of power. It provides for an independent judiciary to guarantee those rights and curb the abuses that inevitably come with great power. There is much to recommend it. But there is no evidence that it reduces terrorism or prevents terrorism. Regrettably, it seems that regime type has no relationship to the development or prevalence of terrorism. Thus, a fundamental assumption of the Bush Administration's push for democracy in the Arab world as part of the war on terrorism is seriously flawed.
Arab Democracy: What to Expect
Would democratically elected Arab governments be as cooperative with the United States as the current authoritarian incumbents? That is highly unlikely. To the extent that public opinion can be measured in these countries, we know that Arabs are very supportive of democracy. When they have a chance to vote in real elections, they generally turn out in percentages far greater than Americans do. However, we also know that the United States is distinctly unpopular in the Arab world now. If Arab governments were to more accurately reflect public opinion, they would be more anti-American. We also know that, in recent free elections in the Arab world, Islamists have done very well. Moves toward Arab democracy will, at least for the foreseeable future, most likely generate Islamist governments which will be less likely to cooperate with the United States on important American policy goals, including American basing rights in the region and peace with Israel.
Arab Public Opinion: Yes to Democracy, No to the United States
Arabs in general do not have any problem with democracy, though some Islamist ideologues do. The Pew Global Attitudes Project conducted public opinion surveys in a number of Arab countries in 2003, asking the question whether "democracy is a Western way of doing things that would not work here" or whether democracy would work" in that country. In Kuwait, 83% said democracy would work there, only 16% thought it would not; in Jordan, 68% said democracy would work there, 25% disagreed; in the Palestinian Authority, 53% thought democracy would work there, 38% disagreed.
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In a 2002 poll by Zogby International, majorities of those polled in five Arab states (Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) had a favorable attitude toward American freedom and democracy, even while holding very unfavorable attitudes toward U.S. policy in the Arab world.
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In that same Zogby International poll, in 7 Arab countries "civil/personal rights" ranked as the most important political issue among those polled, exceeding health care, the Palestinian issue and economic questions. 16 ), in general Arabs are enthusiastic about voting and elections. Arguments that Arab "culture" is a bar to democracy simply do not stand up to scrutiny.
The problem for the United States in promoting democracy in the Arab world is not that Arabs do not like democracy, it is that Washington will probably not like the governments that Arab democracy would produce. If we assume that more democratic Arab governments will be more affected by their publics' opinions than the incumbent Arab regimes, Arab democracy should produce more anti-American foreign policies. In a February-March 2003 poll conducted by Zogby International and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland in 6 Arab countries, overwhelming majorities held either a very or somewhat unfavorable attitude toward the United States. Lebanon had the highest percentage of those polled who saw the United States in either a very or somewhat favorable light -32%. The overall favorable rating of the U.S. in Egypt was 13%, in the United Arab Emirates was 10%, in Morocco and Jordan was 6% and in Saudi Arabia was 4%.
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These numbers most certainly were affected by the Iraq War, which was either about to occur or was occurring as the poll was conducted. However, these numbers are not that much different from those found in less comprehensive polls conducted before and after the Iraq War. In a Gallup poll conducted in early 2002 in a number of Muslim countries, strong majorities in Jordan (62%) and Saudi Arabia (64%) gave the United States an unfavorable rating. Only in Lebanon did favorable views of the United States roughly balance unfavorable views. 18 In a Zogby International poll conducted in seven Arab countries at about the same time, unfavorable ratings of the United States ranged from a low of 48% in Kuwait (a plurality of those polled) to highs of 87% in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with unfavorable ratings in Egypt of 76% and Jordan of 61%. 19 In a Pew Global Attitudes poll conducted in March 2004, one year after the Iraq War, 93% of Jordanians had either a somewhat unfavorable or a very unfavorable attitude toward the United States; 68% of Moroccans had similar views. 20 While it is not possible to pinpoint, from available poll data, the precise sources of antiAmerican feeling in the Arab world, there are indications that it is American policy in the region, not a rejection of American ideals, which drives Arab anti-Americanism. In the February-March 2003 poll by the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland and Zogby International, in every Arab country except the UAE those polled said that their attitudes toward the United States are based more on American policy than on their values. In Egypt, 46% identified American policy as the source of their feelings, 43% identified their values. In the other countries polled (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan), no fewer than 58% said their views on America were based on American policy. 21 Arab publics are particularly cynical (or, at least were in 2004) about the American policy of democracy promotion in their region. In the May 2004 poll done by the Sadat Chair and Zogby International, only in Lebanon did a substantial percentage of those polled (44%) believe that the promotion of democracy was an important motive in the American war against Iraq. 25% of Jordanians polled saw democracy as an important motive for the war. In the other four countries polled (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE), fewer than 10% saw democracy as one of America's motives for the war. Majorities in most of the countries saw the war as motivated by an American desire to control oil, weaken the Muslim world and protect Israel. 22 In the less extensive Pew Global Attitudes survey of 2004, only 17% of Moroccans polled and 11% of Jordanians thought that the American "war on terrorism" was a sincere effort, not a cover for other goals. 23 One need not do a poll to know that American policy on Arab-Israeli questions is very unpopular in the Arab world.
There is no doubt that public opinion can be a fickle thing. Anti-American feelings in the Arab world could change markedly with events. These numbers are not written in stone. It is possible (though there is little data to test the assertion) that Arab anti-Americanism would decline if Washington no longer supported authoritarian Arab governments. It certainly seems, from anecdotal evidence, that the Iranian public has a more favorable impression of the United States than the Iranian government. However, there is little to indicate that the Syrian public, whose government is even more authoritarian than Iran's and equally out of favor with Washington, is pro-American. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the United States is very unpopular in the Arab world because of all of its policies there, not simply its strong relations with unpopular governments. Thus, Arab governments more in tune with their public opinions, as democratic governments must be, will feel enormous pressure to distance themselves from the United States.
Arab Elections: The Recent Record
It is very likely, based upon past performance, that real democratic elections in Arab states will redound to the benefit of Islamist candidates, groups and parties. In many recent Arab elections, the Islamists did very well. In all recent Arab elections, they emerged as the leading political force in opposition to the government. This very brief survey of relatively free Arab elections gives an overview of how Islamist parties have performed: candidates. 24 While this was a slight reduction in their numbers from the 1999 election, Islamists form the dominant ideological bloc in the Kuwaiti parliament.
• In the Jordanian parliamentary election of 2003, held after three postponements and a change in the electoral laws to benefit independent candidates, pro-regime independents swept the field, with 87 of 110 seats. The Muslim Brotherhood's political party, the Islamic Action Front, won 17 seats and independent Islamists another 3 seats. As a percentage of seats, the Islamists performance was down from their stronger showings in the 1989 and 1993 elections (the IAF boycotted the 1997 election). However, they form the major opposition bloc and tended to run first in urban districts.
• The trend in Arab elections is absolutely clear. In free elections, Islamists of various hues win. In elections where there is a governing party (or a royal preference, as in Jordan), Islamists run second and form the opposition. Only in Morocco, where more secularleft parties have a long history and organizational presence, was there an organized non-Islamist political bloc, independent of the government, which could compete with Islamist forces. The trends do not look like they are about to change. In the 2004 Sadat Chair-Zogby International poll, pluralities of those polled in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE thought that the clergy should play a greater role in their political systems. In Egypt 47% supported a greater clerical role, while 50% said the clergy should not dictate the political system, almost a tie. Only in Lebanon (with its large Christian minority) and Morocco did anti-clerical sentiment dominate (51% to 33% in Morocco and 50% to 28% in Lebanon). 31 The more democratic the Arab world gets, the more likely it is that Islamists will come to power there.
Conclusion
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Bush Administration's push for democracy in the Arab world is unlikely to have much effect on anti-American terrorism emanating from that part of the world, but could help bring to power governments that will be much less cooperative with the United States on a whole range of issues (including, probably, cooperation in the war on terrorism and, most certainly, the Arab-Israeli peace process and military-strategic issues) than the current Arab regimes. Washington's democracy initiative can be defended as an effort to spread American democratic values, whatever the cost, or as a long-term gamble that the realities of governance will either moderate Islamists or lead to public disaffection from them once they are in power, as has happened in Iran. It does not serve immediate American interests either in the war on terrorism or in other important policy areas in the region.
If Washington continues on the democracy promotion road in the Arab world, at least it can take a lesson from the variety of electoral experiences briefly reviewed here. Where there are strongly-rooted non-Islamists parties, as in Morocco, the Islamists have a harder time dominating the field. Conversely, where non-Islamist political forces have been suppressed, as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Islamist parties and candidates can dominate the field. Washington should take no comfort from the success of ruling parties in Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt against Islamist challengers. We know that, once stripped of their patronage and security control levers, ruling parties do not do very well in democratic transitional elections. The United States should focus on pushing Arab governments to open up the political space for liberal, leftist, nationalist and other non-Islamist parties to set down roots and mobilize their voters. That will take time, but, if the United States really does see the democracy promotion initiative in the Arab world as a "generational challenge," it should be willing to take the time. If not, it should get ready for more Islamist and more anti-American Arab governments.
